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      Issue 
Has Briggs failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 
denying his Rule 35 motion for reduction of his unified sentence of 10 years, with two 




Briggs Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
 
 On January 24, 2016, Briggs drove through the City of Boise while under the 
influence of a controlled substance, “‘fell asleep at the wheel,’” drove off the roadway, 
 2 
and crashed his van into a fence.  (PSI, pp.3-4, 278.1)  When officers responded, Briggs 
was still asleep, with the engine running and the vehicle in drive; officers “had to pound 
on the driver’s window for Briggs to wake up.”  (PSI, p.278.)  Briggs failed field sobriety 
testing and officers arrested him for DUI and on two outstanding warrants.  (PSI, p.278.)  
Upon searching Briggs’ vehicle, officers found a black zipper pouch containing “various 
drug paraphernalia-related items, such as a cut straw, spoon, plastic baggies, and a 
digital scale”; a tin “which contained a digital scale, three individual baggies containing 
4.5g, 2.3g, and 2.3g” of methamphetamine and a plastic bag containing Oxymorphone; 
and a backpack containing 13 cellular phones.  (PSI, pp.3-4, 278.)   
The state charged Briggs with possession of methamphetamine with intent to 
deliver, possession of Oxymorphone, misdemeanor DUI, and possession of drug 
paraphernalia.  (R., pp.36-37.)  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Briggs pled guilty to 
possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and misdemeanor DUI, and the 
state dismissed the remaining charges, agreed not to file a persistent violator 
enhancement, and also agreed to recommend a sentence of “not more than 2+8 with 
imposition.”2  (R., p.40.)  The district court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with 
two years fixed.  (R., pp.50-54.)  Briggs filed a timely Rule 35 motion for a reduction of 
 
                                            
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “BRIGGS 
44328 psi.pdf.”   
 
2 In his Appellant’s brief, Briggs incorrectly states that the state agreed to recommend “a 
suspended sentence of ten years, with two years fixed.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.2.)  The 
record indicates that the state agreed to – and did – recommend that the sentence be 
imposed, not suspended.  (R., pp.40, 43; Tr., p.3, Ls.6-12; PSI, pp.1, 24-25.)  
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sentence, which the district court denied.  (R., pp.61-64, 71-74.)  Briggs filed a notice of 
appeal timely only from the district court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion.  (R., pp.78-
80.)   
Briggs asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 
motion for a reduction of sentence because he was placed in restrictive housing and will 
not be eligible for programming until 2017, and because, he claims, “the district court’s 
decision to deny [his] motion for leniency was inextricably tied to its erroneous 
interpretation of [his] past sentences, and its belief that he had already had multiple 
rehabilitative opportunities on probation.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-8.)  Briggs has failed 
to establish an abuse of discretion.   
In State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007), the Idaho 
Supreme Court observed that a Rule 35 motion “does not function as an appeal of a 
sentence.”  The Court noted that where a sentence is within statutory limits, a Rule 35 
motion is merely a request for leniency, which is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Id. 
 Thus, “[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence 
is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district 
court in support of the Rule 35 motion.”  Id.  Absent the presentation of new evidence, 
“[a]n appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review 
the underlying sentence.”  Id.  Accord State v. Adair, 145 Idaho 514, 516, 181 P.3d 440, 
442 (2008).   
Briggs did not appeal the judgment of conviction in this case, and he failed to 
provide any “new” information in support of his Rule request for leniency.  In his Rule 35 
motion, Briggs merely stated that he was placed in restrictive housing and was “not 
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eligible for programs until 2017.”  (R., p.62.)  The district court was aware, at the time of 
sentencing, of Briggs’ desire to participate in programming and that he may be placed in 
“solitary confinement” at the prison due to his history.  (See PSI, p.25 (“I want help and 
treatment I don’t want to be warehoused I cant obtain programs in [prison] because of 
the seriousness of the threat to my safety’” (verbatim)); Tr., p.11, Ls.15-19 (“His prior 
incarcerations hav[e] largely been ISMI, and he’s maxed out ….  He’s never had any 
significant drug treatment”); Tr., p.12, Ls.7-13 (“Prison doesn’t necessarily work for Mr. 
Briggs … he simply isn’t getting the treatment that he wants or needs while 
incarcerated, and he has very little confidence based on past history that that’s going to 
be afforded to him if he’s sent to the state on this occasion”); Tr., p.14, L.15 – p.15, L.13 
(“My concern with the prison is that the sentence structure and past DOR history, is that 
their answer … is going to be the same as it always has, which is … we’re going to 
throw the key away and just forget about him, and that’s what’s happened to me.  …  
Their response has been to just segregate me and keep me in solitary confinement”); 
PSI, pp.5-17 (Brigg’s history of criminal offending, violating probation, and excessive 
number of DOR’s (at least 30) and jail incident reports (33 since 2011).)  Furthermore, 
the Department of Correction’s decision with respect to Briggs’ housing placement while 
incarcerated does not fall under the purview of the district court’s discretion, nor is it 
“new” information that entitles Briggs to a reduction of sentence.   
Although Briggs asserts, on appeal, that his IDOC classification is “prohibit[ing] 
him from receiving programming,” there is no indication that this is the case; in fact, the 
opposite is true, as the inmate classification sheet notes that Briggs will be parole-
eligible in 2018 and should begin substance abuse programming and Thinking for a 
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Change in 2017.  (Appellant’s brief, p.5; R., p.66.)  In his Rule 35 motion, Briggs merely 
complained that he was unable to immediately access programming.  (R., pp.62-63.)  It 
is not new information that prisoners are most often placed in programming nearer to 
their date of parole eligibility.  Further, “alleged deprivation of rehabilitative treatment is 
an issue more properly framed for review either through a writ of habeas corpus or 
under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.”  State v. Sommerfeld, 116 Idaho 
518, 520, 777 P.2d 740, 742 (Ct. App. 1989) (affirming district court's denial of 
defendant's I.C.R. 35 motion).   
Because Briggs presented no new evidence in support of his Rule 35 motion, he 
failed to demonstrate in the motion that his sentence was excessive.  Having failed to 
make such a showing, he has failed to establish any basis for reversal of the district 
court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion.   
Even if this Court addresses the merits of Briggs’ claim, Briggs has still failed to 
establish an abuse of discretion.  Briggs contends that “the district court’s decision to 
deny [his] motion for leniency was inextricably tied to its erroneous interpretation of [his] 
past sentences, and its belief that he had already had multiple rehabilitative 
opportunities on probation.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.7.)  Specifically, Briggs points to the 
district court’s comment, in its order denying his Rule 35 motion, that it did not agree 
with Briggs’ claim that “he’d never had rehabilitative programming except growing up 
supervised in the juvenile corrections system and a rider” because Briggs “had [the] 
benefit of … probation on his weapons felony in 2005 (for which he was later violated), 
and probation for his felony possession of controlled substance from 2009 (which 
probation was successful and later discharged[)].”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-7; R., p.73 
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(parenthetical notations original).)  Briggs asserts that, because he served time in prison 
in these two specific cases, the district’s belief that he had already had multiple 
rehabilitative opportunities while on probation court was erroneous.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp.6-7.)  However, according to the PSI, Briggs was sentenced – on December 2, 2005 
– to 18 months of prison “followed by 3 years of supervised release,” and he “was 
released from custody to U.S. Probation” on January 12, 2006; he was subsequently 
“charged with” (and found guilty of) a “Violation of Probation” and was ordered to serve 
six months in prison, “followed by 30 months supervised release”; and he was later 
found guilty of a “Parole Violation” and was consequently ordered to serve an additional 
nine months in prison.  (PSI, p.16 (emphasis added).)  Briggs did not object to the 
interchangeable use of the terms “supervised release” and “probation” in the PSI; as 
such, it was not improper for the court to use the same language.  Moreover, that the 
court characterized Briggs’ supervised release as “probation” is inconsequential 
because both are forms of community supervision, and Briggs did, in fact, have 
rehabilitative opportunities while on supervised release, which was the crux of the 
district court’s statement.  (See Tr., p.11, Ls.15-18 (“except for his federal supervised 
release supervision, he’s never had any kind of aftercare” (emphasis added)).) 
With respect to the district court’s statement regarding the 2009 felony 
possession of controlled substance case, it does appear that the court mistakenly wrote 
that Briggs was granted probation in that particular case.  (R., p.73; PSI, p.10.)  
However, such an error was necessarily harmless, as the court’s overall conclusion that 
Briggs had previously been afforded opportunities for treatment while in the community 
was correct and, more importantly, the court’s primary focus in denying Briggs’ Rule 35 
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motion was Briggs’ ongoing criminal offending and the risk he poses to the community, 
not Briggs’ rehabilitation.  (R., pp.71-74.)  Where a district court’s discretionary decision 
is “tainted by … factual error, the appropriate appellate response ordinarily is to remand 
for a proper exercise of discretion, free of error.”  State v. McDonald, 124 Idaho 103, 
107, 856 P.2d 893, 897 (Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted).  “However, a remand may be 
avoided if it is plain from the judge’s own expressed reasoning that the result would not 
change.”  Id. (emphasis omitted).   
The district court was correct in concluding that Briggs has previously been 
afforded multiple opportunities for probation and programming.  Briggs’ record indicates 
that he has been placed on probation in at least 11 different cases, and he has violated 
the terms of community supervision at least eight times.  (PSI, pp.5-16.)  Briggs 
indicated that he was provided with “aftercare” while on federal supervision, and stated 
that he participated in the ARC program “upon his release from prison in 2010” and 
attended treatment at the Port of Hope in 2011.  (Tr., p.11, Ls.15-18; PSI, p.23.)  In 
addition, “staff at District 4 in Boise” reported that Briggs attended “drug & alcohol 
groups” at their office.  (PSI, p.33.)  As such, the district court was correct in concluding 
that Briggs had, in fact, had previous opportunities for rehabilitative treatment, 
regardless of whether or not those opportunities took place during a probationary period 
specifically for the 2009 possession of a controlled substance case.   
Moreover, the court made the statement with respect to the 2005 and 2009 
cases in the course of disagreeing with Briggs’ claim that he had never had 
opportunities for treatment, not as its reason for denying his Rule 35 motion.  (R., p.73.)  
In fact, the court agreed that Briggs “is in need of rehabilitative treatment,” but advised 
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that it was “not willing to expedite [Briggs’] treatment over those within the Department 
of Corrections that have not yet had the opportunity for that treatment.”  (PSI, p.73.)  
The district court articulated its reasons for denying Briggs’ Rule 35 request for leniency, 
specifically stating that Briggs’ sentence “was reasonable at the time given [Briggs’] 
criminal history and continuing course of criminal conduct,” and correctly noting that the 
primary sentencing consideration is the good order and protection of society.  (R., p.73.)  
The court detailed Briggs’ numerous criminal convictions in the two years preceding the 
instant offense, concluding that Briggs’ conduct demonstrated “a return to criminogenic 
thinking and exhibit[s] a danger to the community.”  (R., p.73.)  The district court 
concluded its analysis by stating:  
To the extent Defendant contends he would obtain better 
rehabilitative programming if he were placed on the retained jurisdiction 
program, the Court notes, “that rehabilitation – important as it may be – is 
not the sole objective of our criminal justice system. A sentence of 
confinement is not rendered unreasonable simply because it will have an 
arguably negative impact upon [Defendant]'s rehabilitation.”  State v. 
Morrison, 1191daho 229, 232, 804 P.2d 1360, 1363 (Ct. App. 1991) 
(citations omitted).  See also State v. Wargi, 119 Idaho 292, 294, 805 P.2d 
498, 500 (Ct. App. 1991).  
 
(R., pp.73-74.)  It is clear, from the district court’s expressed reasoning in its order 
denying Briggs’ Rule 35 motion, that even if the court were to consider the fact that 
Briggs was not placed on probation in the 2009 case, doing so would not have affected 
the court’s decision to deny Briggs’ request for leniency.  Because the same result 
would have been reached without the alleged error, any such error was necessarily 
harmless. 
At sentencing, the state addressed the seriousness of the offense, Briggs’ failure 
to accept full responsibility for his criminal conduct, the danger he poses to society, his 
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low rehabilitative potential and failure to rehabilitate despite prior treatment 
opportunities, and his abysmal history of criminal conduct, victimizing others, and 
refusing to abide by institutional rules.  (Tr., p.3, L.5 – p.5, L.25 (Appendix A).)  The 
district court subsequently articulated the correct legal standards applicable to its 
decision and also set forth its reasons for imposing Briggs’ sentence.  (Tr., p.19, L.7 – 
p.22, L.6 (Appendix B).)  The sentence imposed was appropriate, and Briggs has not 
shown that he was entitled to a reduction of his sentence simply because he would like 
to begin programming sooner.  The state submits that Briggs has failed to show that the 
district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of 
sentence, for reasons more fully set forth in the attached excerpts of the sentencing 
hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its argument on appeal.  (Appendices A 
and B.)  
 
Conclusion 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order 
denying Briggs’ Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence. 
       




      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________ 
      LORI A. FLEMING 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      VICTORIA RUTLEDGE 





CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 10th day of January, 2017, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic 
copy to: 
 
SALLY J. COOLEY  
  DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 




      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________ 
     LORI A. FLEMING 















APPENDIX A – Page 1 
 
State v. Christopher D. Briggs 
1 BOISE, IDAHO 
2 APRIL 28, 2016 
























THE COURT: State of Idaho versus Christopher 
Briggs. Mr. Briggs is present in custody. He's 
represented by Mr. Thomson, and the state Is represented 
by Mr. Wittwer in this case. I've had an opportunity to 
receive and review the presentence investigation in this 
case. 
Mr. Wittwer, have you had the opportunity to 
receive and review that? 
MR. WITIWER: I have, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Did you note any additions or 
corrections? 
MR. WITIWER: No; I did not 
THE COURT: Mr. Thomson, have you had the 
opportunity to review it? 
MR. THOMSON: We have. 
THE COURT: And, Mr. Briggs, have you had the 
opportunity to review that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
1 request for restitution? 
2 MR. THOMSON: No; we've been over that already, 
3 Your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: Mr. Wittwer, you can argue. 
5 MR. WITIWER: Thank you. 
6 Your Honor, the state recommends that the court 
7 impose a sentence consistent with the plea agreement in 
8 this case and order a judgment of conviction with a 
9 sentence of 10 years with 2 years fixed and 8 years 
I 10 indeterminate. I'm not going to recommend fine as we're 
11 recommending imposition of sentence, and the court has 
12 ordered a restitution in excess of $700 here. 
I 13 On Count 3, the DUI, I would just ask the court 
14 to order a concurrent amount of jail time as well as a 
15 six months driver's license suspension as required by 
I 1& law. This was a case where the defendant was driving a 
17 van. It crashed into a fence. This was during the 
1
1 a middle of the day on a road that's pretty busy. That 
19 time of day, it's a populated area. The police 
20 responded to a call for an injury crash, found the 
121 defendant crashed into a fence passed out in the 
22 driver's seat behind the wheel of a van with the engine 
23 still running. They noticed that he had needle marks on 
124 his arms. They conducted standardized field sobriety 
25 tests on him, which he failed. He did not register any 
Case No. CR-FE-2016-0000942 
1 THE COURT: And did you talk with your counsel 
2 about whether there's any additions or corrections? 
3 THE DEFENDANT: I think we're good. 
4 THE COURT: Mr. Thomson, did you note any 
5 additions or corrections? 
8 MR. THOMSON: I do have corrections. Many of 
7 them are corrections with characterizations. I think 
8 I1l bring those up in argument if that's all right 
9 THE COURT: Okay. The way the presentence 
10 investigator characterizes his responses? 
11 MR. THOMSON: Correct. 
12 THECOURT: Soyoudon'tdisagreethatthat's 
13 what he said to the presentenoe Investigator? 
14 MR. THOMSON: But there are some objections to 
15 actually what was said. 
18 THE COURT: All right. I'll take those by way 
17 of argument in that this is what the presentence 
18 investigator prepared based on their perceptions; okay? 
19 MR. THOMSON: Okay. 
20 THE COURT: Is there a request for restitution? 
21 MR. WITIWER: There is, Your Honor. I provided 
22 a copy of a proposed order to counsel just a moment ago, 
23 and the information was previously sent to his office. 
24 We're requesting $703.66. 
25 THE COURT: ls there any objection to that 
1 alcohol content on the breath test, and they attempted 
2 to do a DRE, but he was not able to stay awake and 
3 comply with that, so they did a blood draw. He was 
4 charged with DUI for being under the influence of drugs. 
5 In the van was found methamphetamlne in three 
6 different baggies. There was paraphernalia found, 
7 including two digital scales. There were over so 
8 plastic baggies that were found, typically, the types 
9 used for packaging or containing controlled substances, 
10 such as, methamphetamine, and then there were multiple 
11 phones as well that were found. 
12 Mr. Briggs pled guilty in this case to 
13 possession with intent to deliver, but at this point, 
14 it's very clear that he's not accepting responsibility 
15 for the crime that he pled guilty to. He's not 
18 accountable, and I believe that that raises his risk 
17 level significantly. 
18 The conduct in this case and the facts of what 
19 occurred really show that he is a continuing risk to the 
20 welfare of the community. As I said, this crash 
21 happened in the middle of the day. He was admittedly 
22 coming down off of methamphetamine and ju.st he himself, 
23 quote/unquote, "crashed on methamphetamine" and ended up 
24 crashing the car he was driving, which could have very 
25 easily resulted, again, as in a lot of DUI cases, in 
•onny Tardiff, CSR #712. (208) 287-7588 
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1 inj ury or death to an innocent bystander or another 1 Thank you. 
2 motorist. 2 THE COURT: Thank you. 
3 Clearly, he has serious substance-abuse 3 Mr. Thomson, would you like to be heard? 
4 problems. Criminal history-wise, he has a very long 4 MR. THOMSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
5 felony and misdemeanor record. His record is contained 5 In reviewing the presentence materials with my 
6 between 10 and 11 pages in the PSI. It's noted in the 6 client, my client was struck with some of the 
7 presentence report that he has numerous jail incident 7 characterizations that he believed were implied or come 
8 reports since 2011, which include disrespect to staff 8 from just a plain reading of the presentence report. He 
9 and disregard for the property at the jail, damaging 9 personally has suspicions as to whether there was a bias 
10 property and such. It's clear to the state that he 10 involved in the interview from the presentence report. 
11 isn't just an addict. It's apparent that he's also 11 We're not asking that it be re-done or re-evaluated. 
12 selling. His priors aren't just drug-related. They are 12 Mr. Briggs was in a former relationship with 
13 violent crimes. There's theft. There's a weapons 13 Rebecca Wills of the Parole Commission and at least it's 
14 charge, violation of court orders, resisting and 14 his belief that that individual may have reached out in 
15 obstructing, so a wide variety of crimes that also show 15 the preparation of this presentence investigation. Of 
16 that he is on multiple occasions victimized others. 16 course, I have no information to that effect other than 
17 He has been given prior rehabilitative 17 Mr. Briggs sort of asking himself why the presentence 
18 opportunities and based on what I see of his history, 18 investigator in this ease would, in his own mind, have 
19 his ongoing conduct, and then the attitude just 19 it out for him, and just a couple of examples that I 
20 generally that's reflected in his lack of 20 wanted to bring up in the presentence materials where me 
21 accountability, showing in the statements that he makes, 21 client does sort of dispute -- or does dispute how he 
22 I do not see Mr. Briw as someone with a high 22 was quoted. 
23 rehabilitation potential at this point, so based on all 23 On page 4 on the last paragraph, there was --
24 that, Your Honor, I believe that the plea agreement 24 the last full paragraph on line 4 -- he indicates that 
25 sentence is approoriate, and I'm asking you impose it. 25 he had told the pre.sentence investigator that he was in 
1 Missouri with his mother. He was home for about a 1 in the presentence investigation, so I don't know if 
2 year-and-a-half, instead of a year, and on page 4, 18 2 that's a term that they use to almost to sort of 
3 and 19, when describing his previous marriage, the 3 indicate itinerant housing situations. 
4 presentence investigator indicates that he met her while 4 And then on page 2 2, in the middle paragraph, 
5 partying; although, my client indicates that he may have 5 under my client's "Mental Health", the second paragraph 
6 told her that they met at a bar, that there was never 6 under the Mental Health caption, the direct quote that 
7 indication that that was necessarily partying; that be 7 she used in her recitation of their interview says, 
8 was out doing drugs; that it was reckless; that it was 8 "Because I had done so much time in solitacy 
9 any kind of a -- he thought that that characterization 9 confinement. I lack social skills." Again, my client 
10 diminished and minimized that relationship or the 10 says that he never said that, not necessarily the way 
11 seriousness which he took it at the time. 11 that he speaks, a phrase that would be vecy unlikely 
12 On page 19, it does appear that the presentence 12 that he would have used. He does ad.mit that because of 
13 investigator contacted Mr. Robert Johnson. I believe at 13 his time in custody and closed custody that he doesn't 
14 the top of page 19 on the first page -- there may have 14 necessarily like being around people and that message 
15 just been an omission -- but it says, "And would plan to 15 was probably conveyed in those terms, that he prefers to 
15 live with his Robert J ohnson. I believe that should say 16 be alone, that he likes to do things alone, so he 
17 "Boss Robert Johnson who has a job for him in the 17 doesn't necessarily dispute the message there, but the 
18 future", and she characterized that as a possible job. 18 actual terms, given the fact that that was in quotes. 
19 Elsewhere, she contacted Mr. Johnson. It does sound 19 And then he disputes the fact that he ever used 
20 like Mr. Johnson was willing to give him employment upon 20 the tenn "dick head" in his interview with the 
21 his release, so to the extent that she meant possible 21 presentenc.e investigator when speaking about the police 
22 only conditional upon his release, then that would be 22 officer, so those are some of the disputations that my 
23 fair. On page 19, again, he disputes that he ever used 23 client has with regard to the presentence materials. 
24 the term "couch surfing". That's not necessarily 24 I wanted to bring up just two points in making 
25 something in his vocabulary, but I do see it frequently 25 Mr. Briw' request. He is asking that Your Honor 
Penny Tardiff, CSR #712. (208) 287-7588 
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State v. Christooher D. Bria-
1 the same processes when I get out with nothing but the 
2 clothes on my back. I go back to the home front. I'll 
3 make us some money and I'm here to get on track and back 
4 on your feet. I don't want to do that. I don't want to 
5 keep doing that. I'm 37 years old. I've got health 
6 problems now. I'm getting older. I'm ready to settle 
7 down and, you know, start living life responsibly. 
8 I feel like I would benefit from the treatment 
9 programs that would not be available to me out there. 
10 Why? Because I take life a lot more seriously now. I 
11 realize that ifl were given probation today that, 
12 Briggs, this is yourlast chance. You know, if you mess 
13 up again, you are going to go to prison. You're going 
14 to get Info Part II. You're going to sexve the rest of 
15 your life in maximum security. 
16 I'm just asking the court to recognize that, you 
17 know, the change of circumstance between now and back 
18 then and just not characterize me as the same old Briggs 
19 that's always come in here. I'm asking for a chance at 
20 probation. You know, the U.S. probation officer, those 
21 were not things where I just refused to conform to, you 
22 know, the conditions of supervised release. It was tlat 
23 out, no; I don't want to do this. I'm not ready for 
24 this. I'd rather just rather have my sentence imposed 
25 and do my time. I chose not to do community 
1 tosay. 
2 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
3 Does either party have any legal cause why 
4 sentence cannot be imposed? 
5 MR. WITIWER: No, Your Honor. 






THE COURT: Mr. Briggs, your counsel indicated 
the Toohill factors. What he was referring to is 
there's four factors I have to consider in every case, 
and that's the protection of society, the deterrence of 
crime, the rehabilitation of the offender as well as 
12 punishment, and in this particular case, I've also 
I 13 considered the criteria under 19-2521, which is the 
14 criteria for placing someone on probation or imposing 
1
15 imprisonment. And I do count people's criminal history, 
18 and I count them, not just by number, but I also count 
17 them by frequency, and so this isn't an issue of simple 
1
1a math of this is a fourth felony, so fourth felony, this 
19 is the answer. 
20 I recognize that you came out of juvenile 
121 detention to pick up your first felony and go on a 
22 rider, and you were relinquished at that time. A lot 
23 can change over 20 years. And I specifically lined off 
l 24 2014 and 2015. Those were not particularly good years 25 for you because I noticed the frequency of your 
Case No. CR-FE-2016-0000942 
1 supervision. It wasn't me out running a muck, you know, 
2 causing problems; it was me asking the judge to revoke 
3 me so I could go back and finish my time. I haven't had 
4 any programming. I went to C.Ottonwood because I had my 
5 HSC and because I didn't have a drug problem back then, 
6 I was assigned to labor detail. After two weeks, I was 
7 sent back to prison. You know, I didn't get to do 
8 education classes. I didn't get to do treatment 
9 courses, ABC, CSC. I've never gotten none of those 
10 classes. I feel like I would benefit from that now. 
11 I'm a little bit older and little bit more willing to 
12 pay attention. 
13 I've been relatively incident-free in jail this 
14 time. There was an incident that I have no recollection 
15 even occurring. When I first came into custody, I was 
16 asleep, so I missed my first two video arraignments 
17 because I couldn't stay awake. Apparently, there was an 
18 incident in medical where I raised my voice at a deputy. 
19 I have no recollection. You know, I need to wake up and 
20 realize what's going on around me, and I found myself 
21 kind of where I'm not even remembering. I'm blacking 
22 out, sleeping. I can't even get up and make my court 
23 appearances because I'm coming down so hard, and then 
24 it's time to wake up and get with the program. I'm 
25 asking the court give me a program. That's all I have 
1 behaviors were certainly increasing during those 
2 timeframes, albeit, misdemeanors. 
3 But, perhaps, the issues with the presentence 
4 investigator, as well as with the prison system, can be 
5 answered some by your criminal history and the repeated 
6 instances of domestic violence, battery, disturbing the 
7 peace, disturbing the peace, harassment, stalking, 
8 resisting and obstructing, assaults, contempt, probation 
9 violations, those types of behaviors, and I point this 
10 out to you, not to tell you that we should just flush 
11 you away, you're doing life on the installment plan, but 
12 you have to take accountability for how you got here, 
13 but I agree, people get tired of this, and you've got to 
14 do something different, but something different has to 
15 start with you. Everything can't be authority's 
18 problem. 
17 So the approach to rehabilitation, I know that 
18 you say you've never had rehabilitative programing 
19 except for the juvenile detention, but that programming 
20 is going to be available in the Department of 
21 C.Orrections if you conform your behavior. Department of 
22 Corrections has changed, and I know you don't think 
23 that's true. It has changed. It is changing. The same 
24 programs that were available on the rider are available 
25 before parole, but your access to those programs are 
Penny Tardllf, CSR #712 • (208) 287,7588 
5 ot 6 sheets Page 17 to 20 of 23 
APPENDIX B – Page 2 
 
State v. Christopher D. Brillo 
1 going to depend on your behavior within the institution, 
2 and if the behaviors that I see here of disturbing the 
3 peace and resisting and obstructing, batteries, 
4 disorderly conduct, if those are the behaviors that the 
5 parole commission is seeing, you're absolutely right. 
6 You won't be parole-eligible, but they have a great 
7 emphasis now through the legislature restrictions that 
8 they have to release those that they can close to the 
9 end of their fixed time and not to hold them over after 
10 the fixed time, and I want to point that out to you 
11 because the way that you behave when you get to RDU is 
12 going to be essential in whether you get the programming 
13 that you're asking for, but when I have to consider the 
14 factors that I consider, I have to consider protection 
15 of society first, and when you crash your vehicle and 
16 you are so out of it that the First Responders can't 
17 even wake you, I have to look at that, and my first 
18 responsibility to protect the public, but I am very 
19 hopeful for you to actually engage in the rehabilitative 
20 programming because even if I max this sentence out --
21 well, it's a life sentence, but, quite frankly, you're 
22 either going to get it or you're not. 
23 It's been 20 years since you've turned an adult. 
24 You're going to spend the rest of your life on the 
25 instalment plan now that you're a persistent violator 
1 The presentence materials will be sealed in this 
2 case, and I do wish you well, Mr. Briggs. 
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unless you're able to conform your behavior to the rules 
of the community, and I'm really hopeful that you will 
take the sentiment that you've expressed today to the 
institution and behave accordingly so that you can get 
the rehabilitative programing and get an opportunity to 
live on the outside as a law-abiding citizen. 
In this case, I'm going to impose a judgment of 
conviction with 2 years fixed, 8 years indeterminate for 
a total of 10 years on Count 1. On Count 3, I'm going 
to impose six months of confinement. I'm going to 
suspend your driver's license for six months. I'm not 
going to order a fine on either costs. I am going to 
order court costs on each count, restitution of $703.66, 
public defender reimbursement of $250. You will be 
required to submit a DNA sample because you've not yet 
done that. You'll have to pay! $100 restitution for 
that sample. 
Mr. Briggs, this is a final judgment. You have 
the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. The 
time for taking an appeal is 4 2 days from the date the 
judgment is made and filed. You may be represented by 
counsel in bringing that appeal. lf you cannot afford 
to hire an attorney for the appeal, one will be 
appointed to represent you at public expense if you're 
an indigent person under Title 19. 
I 
I 
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